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Security and the shaping of identity for nuclear specialists
Sean F. Johnston*
Atomic energy developed from 1940 as a subject shrouded in secrecy. Identiﬁed succes-
sively as a crucial element in military strategy, national status and export aspirations, the
research and development of atomic piles (nuclear chain-reactors) were nurtured at iso-
lated installations. Like monastic orders, new national laboratories managed their spe-
cialist workers in occupational environments that were simultaneously cosseted and
constrained, deﬁning regional variants of a new state-managed discipline: reactor tech-
nology. This paper discusses the signiﬁcance of security in deﬁning the new subject in
the USA, UK and Canada – wartime allies with similar political traditions but distinct
trajectories in this ﬁeld during the Cold War. The intellectual borders and content of the
subject developed differently in each country, shaped under the umbrella of secrecy by
disparate clusters of expertise, industrial traditions, and national goals. The nascent cadre
was contained until the mid 1950s by classiﬁed publications and state-sponsored special-
ist courses. The early context of high security ﬁltered its members and capped endur-
ingly both their professional aspirations and public engagement.
Keywords: nuclear engineer; security; secrecy; identity; profession; atomic energy
Introduction
The historiography of the nuclear age covers a broad terrain, well mapped in some areas
but sparsely explored in others.1 This paper focuses on the emergence of the technical
specialists who developed atomic energy, and particularly reactor technology, over the
quarter century that began with the Second World War. I compare the evolution of the
ﬁeld in the USA, UK and Canada, because as wartime allies and nations with similar
political traditions they highlight the similarities and differences of this specialist ﬁeld, so
distinctive of the Cold War. Moreover, each of these countries later played a role in inter-
nationalizing their distinct models of nuclear engineering via training courses and the
export of reactor technologies.
The restriction of knowledge was central to the early deﬁnition of this new breed.
Nuclear workers evolved as an amalgam of specialists from the 1940s, shaped by the
exigencies of program secrecy as much as by disciplinary reﬁnement. But despite the
military origins, postwar atomic energy fostered endeavours quite distinct from bomb-
making, inspiring physicists, chemists and a rapidly growing contingent of engineers and
technicians to explore deeper scientiﬁc and technical questions alongside inchoate hopes
of improving their societies by harnessing the atom. These divergent concerns bred new
kinds of specialists. Only a fraction of them – those vocal and visible members of the
‘atomic scientists movement’ who actively promoted internationalism and progressive
ideals during the postwar years – have been the focus of much scholarly attention, as
have contemporary weapons scientists.2
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While such groups arguably could be represented as a technical priesthood, they were
gradually overtaken by another body of specialists more akin to acolytes. The subjects of
the present paper are the cousins of the more studied scientists: the engineers, technicians
and skilled workers responsible for reactor and separations technologies, who have
remained relatively voiceless and unexamined.3 Their occupations ranged from the design
of reactors and radio-chemical processes (expertise dubbed nucleonics by some and
nuclear engineering more widely) to production and maintenance work by lower-grade
specialists.4 Although differences in occupational categories makes enumeration difﬁcult,
their numbers amounted to several thousand professionals and considerably more skilled
workers in North America and the UK by the end of the 1950s, when nuclear power was
becoming their focus and engineers were beginning to overtake scientists.5
These nuclear specialists worked at a handful of wartime government facilities, at
postwar national laboratories and production facilities that succeeded them, and at indus-
trial companies contracted to design, build and operate those facilities. Those employed
by universities generally had close links with the national laboratories, which concen-
trated the material resources and expert labor. Their goals bypassed bomb making – and
indeed in Canada eschewed it – by exploring the potential for nuclear reactors and the
myriad material, chemical, mechanical and thermal factors that determined how they were
engineered. As their growing know-how had strategic importance variously for military
strategy, national status and export aspirations, their governments sought to maintain their
head start in the ﬁeld by restricting the circulation of knowledge.
As this suggests, the role of the state was prominent in these nascent technical profes-
sions, with security playing a key role in shaping their evolution despite their early diver-
gence from military objectives. Secrecy, particularly in the US context and during the
Cold War, has been the focus of studies by sociologist Edward Shils in the mid 1950s,
and Daniel Moynihan from the historical perspective of the post-Soviet period. Both
distinguished functional secrecy – pragmatically necessary control of sensitive knowledge
– from symbolic secrecy, identiﬁed as an ideological extremism having deleterious effects
for a nation and, by extension, to social groups within it.6 The nuclear context of security,
which ampliﬁed and routinized such symbolic secrecy, has been addressed insightfully by
research from the top–down perspective of policy studies,7 but seldom in relation to its
inﬂuence on technical identity, i.e. from the grassroots. Two exceptions are Hugh Guster-
son’s anthropological study of contemporary nuclear weapons scientists, which explores
the effects of secrecy on employees of the Livermore National lab, and Joseph Masco’s
complementary account of present-day Los Alamos, also dedicated to weapons develop-
ment.8 This paper, however, discusses the evolution of measures intended to protect non-
military expertise in atomic energy during its ﬁrst quarter-century, and speciﬁcally their
inﬂuence on the emergence of working identities for a variety of nuclear specialists in the
ﬁrst three countries that supported them – the UK, USA and Canada. Comparison of the
outcomes provides an unusual opportunity to assess the role of national context in disci-
plinary development, and the degree to which the insulating effects of secrecy caused
these pockets of expertise to grow in distinct varieties. The three national programs, partic-
ularly during the decade after the Second World War, amounted to separate and privileged
experiments in the creation of a new intellectual ﬁeld.9
I argue that security was signiﬁcant to technical identity in ﬁve respects: nuclear spe-
cialists were managed in new isolated environments; their intellectual products were clas-
siﬁed for restricted dissemination; their political activities and labour representations were
scrutinized; their collective identity was shaped by pre-existing institutional and industrial
afﬁliations; and their training, job categories and disciplinary labels were assigned largely
124 S.F. Johnston
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
las
go
w]
 at
 23
:52
 19
 Ju
ly 
20
11
 
by their respective governments. Each of these aspects of working life was dissimilar to
prevailing pre-war scientiﬁc and industrial contexts.
Security operated in three spatial domains: the international secrecy operating between
nation-states, the domestic secrecy between different atomic energy sites and the interac-
tional secrecy required of individual nuclear workers. Central to each was intellectual iso-
lation. The term cloister evokes an analogy identifying atomic energy establishments as
akin to monastic sites, and the association of their dedicated workers with enclosed reli-
gious orders. Like mediaeval monasteries, wartime and postwar national laboratories in
the USA, UK and Canada promoted distinct regional variations; they were not founded
primarily with economic motivations, but on locally nuanced and isolated intellectual
foundations; they combined idealism with pragmatic duties; and, they served a strong
central authority. Although a limited analogy, it suggests the peculiar environments for
nuclear workers during their ﬁrst 25 years, and the combination of personal, institutional
and intellectual containment on their working lives.
While this paper focuses on nuclear specialists, it is important to sketch and periodize
the shifting regulatory framework in which they developed. The intent is not to nuance
the details of national policies, but to illustrate their rather blunt yet profound effects for
the careers of nascent technical specialists. Three distinct temporal regimes of security
are relevant to the discussion, as suggested by the brief chronology listed in Table 1. The
ﬁrst was the wartime secrecy imposed by the Manhattan Project and precursor commit-
tees in the USA and UK. The second comprised nearly a decade after the 1946 McMa-
hon Act in the USA, when the circulation of knowledge between the former allies was
limited and during which security measures ebbed and ﬂowed in response to perceived
foreign and domestic threats of espionage in each country. A third, considerably more
relaxed, period followed the late 1953 ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative of the Eisenhower
administration and especially its consolidation by the subsequent UN-sponsored Confer-
ence on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva in August 1955.
In brief, then, the wartime Manhattan Project secrecy, followed by a decade of selec-
tive and varying security measures, was replaced in turn by a cautious openness from the
mid 1950s. These three security regimes did not evolve towards complete transparency,
however: endemic national security concerns gave way to rising commercial secrecy. In
short, the enduring nature of technical specialists in the nuclear ﬁeld owed much to their
cloistered origins.
Wartime containment and gestation
The initial regime of security was instigated by the Manhattan Project, during which the
USA, UK and Canada had on-again, off-again collaboration. The wartime investigations
of atomic energy were undertaken in environments appropriate to a strategically valuable
military secret, and management focused largely on restricting and channeling the ﬂow of
information about the very existence of the project and its technological trajectory. The
principal feature of security, from the standpoint of the technical participants, was intel-
lectual isolation within and between a handful of sites developing reactor and separation
technology. These included the ‘Metallurgical Laboratory’ at the University of Chicago,
soon moved to the nearby Argonne Forest, which originated studies of chain-reactor
design and oversaw their implementation; the Clinton Laboratory at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, responsible for the pilot plant production reactor and developing plutonium
separation processes; Hanford, in Washington state, the site of three plutonium production
reactors; the Montreal Laboratory, Quebec, ﬁrst site of the Anglo-Canadian project, devel-
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oping the theory of heavy-water reactors; and, Chalk River, Ontario, site of the ﬁrst
Canadian reactor.
The chemical company Du Pont de Nemours, responsible for the Manhattan Project
reactor program from late 1942, had implemented high security for its sites, working
groups and individuals. Security measures largely separated design, construction and
operational workers, restricting the information given to each group. Du Pont managers,
long familiar with military security on other contracts, nevertheless disparaged the effects
of segregation for this rapidly evolving ﬁeld:
Stringent security measures have governed all research, design, procurement, construction
and operation procedure in order that the utmost secrecy may be maintained . . . . Personnel
has had to be divided into groups each possessing only such information as is necessary for
its own use in connection with its own part of the work. Engineers and supervisors have had
to be told what must be done but not why, stiﬂing to a major extent the independence of
thought and critical analysis of problems ordinarily considered essential to efﬁcient prosecu-
tion of the work.10
Opposing this compartmentalization was the necessity of making quite complete informa-
tion available to a large group about the pile operation processes so that they ‘could
contribute satisfactorily to the success of the operation and could provide adequately for
the safety of the operating employees and the avoidance of catastrophe.’11 In an entirely
untested engineering domain in which the dangers of intense radiation and potential
explosion could not be estimated, the management militated against secrecy.12 As an ano-
dyne Du Pont summary put it, ‘all of this had to be accomplished without arousing
undue alarm in the minds of employees which would result in lowered efﬁciency or
resignations.’13
Contrasting this need to reveal operational information to a wide selection of employ-
ees, administrators noted the vulnerability of the Hanford plutonium-producing reactors
to sabotage or enemy action. As the ﬁrst of them approached completion in July 1944,
Hanford organized a Protection Department responsible for guarding, patrols, a site police
force and investigations. Within eight months, its personnel exceeded that of the Operat-
ing Department responsible for reactor operations.14 This pattern of surveillance was to
become the norm.
Despite such restraints, the barriers could also provide environments in which to
nurture new specialisms. As Peter Hales has noted in his cultural geography of the
wartime sites, compartmentalization ‘was a means to redesignate scientists and engi-
neers as workers,’ providing not just adequate security from inadvertent leaks but also
efﬁciency.15 Such subordination could also oppose existing hierarchies, and encourage
more equitable cooperation between members. For example, at the Montreal Labora-
tory, the principal Anglo-Canadian nexus during 1943–4, participants found that the
work required new and unfamiliar alliances between fundamental science and engineer-
ing, with engineers unconventionally taking the lead. As Head of Engineering Ronald
E. Newell put it, ‘this meant development of a completely new branch of engineering
. . . . A great deal of new knowledge had to be acquired by the engineers and to
some extent this has also applied to the theoretical and experimental physics sections
and the chemistry section.’16 The conﬁned environment encouraged interdisciplinary
exploration.
Such merging of scientiﬁc and engineering cultures was amenable for the Canadian
participants drawn principally from the National Research Council and for the members
of the British contingent seconded from Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), both of
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which had close associations between engineers and scientists, but there was a hesitancy
for the Montreal Lab scientiﬁc staff to merge in this interdisciplinary work.17 Absorbed
in particular tasks and starved of material resources to build a reactor, the members of
the Montreal theoretical group tended to collaborate little with their engineering col-
leagues.18 Segregation could provide a reassuring familiarity to some participants drawn
into this unfamiliar style of research, however. Indeed, as one of the Canadian scientists
recalled, ‘Secrecy is the main fetish in the wartime military culture . . . . It was science in
a closet. So we worked more or less in our separate corners. Under stress, we could not
afford the luxury of seeing the broad picture, and became technicians in our separate
cells.’19
This local containment was complemented by segregation from important aspects of
the American project, a factor that promoted disciplinary divergence. The reactors for
plutonium generation in Hanford, Washington remained off-limits to the Anglo-Canadian
participants. The Canadian contingent included European participants judged to have
dubious political allegiances, and the British among them – many of whom were sec-
onded from ICI – were distrusted by US administrators for potential commercial espio-
nage.20 The Montreal-based workers had frustratingly little contact with their US
counterparts until late 1943, during which time US expertise had developed rapidly.
Without adequate supplies of uranium, graphite or heavy water essential for a reactor,
and isolated from experimental ﬁndings by their US colleagues, workers at the Montreal
Laboratory consequently developed a local Canadian variant of nuclear knowledge,
devoting most of their effort to relatively sophisticated theoretical studies of heavy-water
based reactor design.21
Similarly, technologies of separating plutonium from spent uranium fuel were closely
guarded by their US counterparts. When the Montreal Laboratory staff was transferred to
the new Chalk River facility in southern Ontario in late 1944, the criticism of US security
requirements grew. An unsigned memo from one of the senior Chalk River staff com-
plained:
The morale [of our chemical engineers] has always been adversely affected by the lack of
exchange of information. We have been forced to do work which we know has been done
already . . . . The result has been that we have been obliged with a group of about 40 men to
do what the Americans did with several thousand.22
As with proﬁciency in reactor technology, then, a distinct variant of nuclear chemical
engineering was developing on each side of the border.
Security inhibited and became ingrained for many participants. The Manhattan Project
scrutinized the activities of the Anglo-Canadian members even beyond the USA. When
General Leslie Groves ruled that French contributors must leave Chalk River at the end
of the war, one asked meekly for ‘clear cut indications as to the nature and extent of the
secrecy regulations to which I am still committed,’ and what he would be able to take to
the new French Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique.23 Those who had left the Anglo-
Canadian project to return to France instituted similar security consciousness there. Key
participant Lew Kowarski reported that ‘Châtillon has its guards, as you in Brookhaven
have yours; we are responsible for some of the secrets and our people are bound by cer-
tain, not very explicit but very binding, secrecy rules.’24 What had been understood as
sensible wartime security precautions for nuclear engineering were thus straightforwardly
exported to other contexts. This combination of administratively decreed and personally
adopted segregation helped to create proto-professions along clearer national lines.
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The postwar cloister
As suggested by the postwar French excommunication and adoption of security appara-
tus, some of the features of wartime security – segregated environments, cosseted isola-
tion and careful monitoring of safety procedures – were ampliﬁed over the following
decade to manage new perceived threats. Other conditions important in shaping technical
identity, notably the ﬁltering and categorization of personnel, developed in distinct
national contexts.
A US cable immediately after the Japanese bombings deﬁned postwar American cen-
sorship policy, which capped not only bomb-making expertise, but the broader and more
fragile ﬁeld of nuclear engineering. The policy censored dissemination of processes, for-
mulas and mechanics; characteristics and quality of production materials; and, informa-
tion on the relative importance of various methods and plants.25 In the light of wider
political factors, NRC Director C.J. Mackenzie and physicist John Cockcroft, responsible
for the wartime Anglo-Canadian project, had little option but to recommend that Canada
and the UK follow the same policy. Nevertheless, the barriers were permeable to varying
degrees. While key US sites remained off-limits to UK and Canadian engineers and sci-
entists, a US liaison ofﬁcer remained based at the Montreal Laboratory and Chalk
River.26
At war’s end the initial mood of participants in all three countries was to declassify
much of their new knowledge, based on scientiﬁc norms of openness and on the per-
ceived potential for international beneﬁt. The 1945 Smyth report consequently divulged
important aspects of atomic energy science and technology.27 For the ﬁrst time, the less
senior engineers, technicians and workers – like the general public – learned the purpose
of the Manhattan Project sites and the nature of their work. The ﬁrst postwar US legisla-
tion, Senator Brien McMahon’s Atomic Energy bill, was drafted with further dissemina-
tion in mind, but within a year had mutated to control nuclear information. The Atomic
Energy Act excluded Britain and Canada from any further collaboration on atomic energy
and conceived national laboratories for US nuclear research. The subsequent roles of gov-
ernments in linking ‘big science’ to national goals are well known.28 In the USA and
UK, atomic weapons programs were planned and implemented. There and in Canada,
atomic energy – broadly conceived – was pursued at a handful of well-funded research
centers.
Security provided a common framework and cage for the postwar ﬁeld. It had clear
aims: to protect secrets of military value, particularly from domestic and foreign com-
munist espionage; to isolate the public from the potential dangers of radioactivity; and, to
sustain the hard-won technological advance of the wartime work for other national or
commercial advantage. Because of this, Canadian research – even though eschewing mili-
tary applications – absorbed many of the security attributes of the US and British sites.
For all three countries, security had knock-on effects for the creation of a cadre of
nuclear engineers. Edward Shils observed that secrecy is a means of controlling suspected
conspiracies.29 Indeed, conspiracies – being actions organized to achieve an end sought
by a group having common interests – have much in common with professional activi-
ties; by attempting to control the former, one is likely to stiﬂe the latter.30
Geographical segregation: national protection and regional isolation
Three factors are notable for the postwar decade. First, as noted above, security concerns
and protective legislation isolated the three former allies. The three countries reduced
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their collaboration in atomic energy substantially, and their laboratories mimicked this tra-
ditional response to external threats.31 Second, national programs, and their goals,
expanded rapidly. Third, this activity was concentrated into a handful of postwar research
centers under the scrutiny of their central governments.
Paul Forman has highlighted the unusual compartmentalization of postwar national
labs, with rapidly growing expertise ring-fenced against the threat of espionage.32 Site
segregation was important for breeding the ﬁrst cohorts of nuclear specialists. In the three
countries, about a dozen government-sponsored facilities specialized in distinct aspects of
nuclear technology, providing what radiochemist Glenn Seaborg later characterized as
‘small islands of technical information sealed off from society.’33 Almost as a by-product
of those activities, a cadre of atomic energy specialists was gestated and nurtured. In
these cloisters, nuclear workers were formed in peculiar postwar environments with
ample resources, cosseted in secure workplaces and isolated from contaminants. Like
novice monks in religious orders, this period of incubation shaped their development and
mature identity.
The wartime installations were expanded into national laboratories which were to focus
resources on distinct intellectual terrain. The Canadian center at Chalk River made the
transition to peace-time with few immediate changes, but the new US Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) decided that Argonne would continue as the US center of reactor tech-
nology, with Oak Ridge relegated to separation processes and chemical technologies – a
categorization resisted by Oak Ridge technical staff, who continued to pursue reactor engi-
neering by interpreting these categories liberally.34 New postwar national laboratories
included the Brookhaven National Laboratory in the USA, which engaged in some reactor
development work, the Atomic Energy Research Establishment (AERE, Harwell, 1946) –
the British equivalent of Argonne and Chalk River – and the Atomic Weapons Research
Establishment (AWRE, Aldermaston, 1950), the British equivalent of the Los Alamos and
later Lawrence Livermore Laboratories in the USA.35 The Industrial Group (1947) of Brit-
ain’s new Department of Atomic Energy, headed by former ICI engineer Christopher Hin-
ton, assumed responsibility for the engineering of piles and separation processes, and had
no exact US equivalent.36 In both countries, production sites – Hanford and later Savan-
nah River, South Carolina, in the USA, and Windscale, Cumbria, in the UK – mixed engi-
neering and science to produce plutonium via large-scale reactors.
Owing to shortage of skilled specialists, the major industrial contractors agreed to
restrict the regional transfer of expertise. Not only did employees have to submit to an
unprecedented degree of site security, but they were literally cloistered by their job condi-
tions: Hanford production workers could not apply to Du Pont for new Savannah River
posts without seeking permission from their current employer, General Electric. The
administrators of the national laboratories negotiated similar agreements to prevent the
poaching of their senior engineering and scientiﬁc staff.37
Interpretations of the McMahon Act also discouraged Americans from joining foreign
establishments. An academic at the University of Chicago, for example, hesitated to
accept an engineering post at McMaster University in Ontario because a colleague
advised that he could be convicted of divulging US atomic secrets to his students. While
dismissing such fears, university and Chalk River administrators could offer only difﬁ-
dent assurances that
there is not the slightest chance of . . . being prosecuted for carrying on ordinary teaching
and research work at any university, providing always that he observes what he is morally
and ethically bound to do; that is, not to pass on directly, and as such, speciﬁc technological
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information which he has obtained as a member of one of the super-secret projects in Amer-
ica.38
Having failed to attract Walter Zinn, the Canadian reactor expert and wartime associate
of Enrico Fermi, to lead the Chalk River program, the Director fumed that security fur-
ther stiﬂed recruitment: ‘there are a few on the staff here who are working on subjects
which they are free to publish and are very likely to leave if publication were not possi-
ble.’39 The Canadian program, having lost its British contingent and indirectly subject to
the US security regime, thus found itself starved of expert labour in the early postwar
years.40
Physical separation abetted such isolation. The heart of the new ﬁeld was the reactor,
and all were situated at geographically remote or isolated sites far from population cen-
ters to obviate the risk of explosion or radioactive release – in the hills of Oak Ridge,
Tennessee; at Hanford, Washington, surrounded by the northern desert of the Paciﬁc
Northwest; in the forests at Chalk River, on an isolated stretch of the Ontario/Quebec
border.41 At several of the sites, segregation extended from the workplace to private life.
Chalk River’s associated town of Deep River, located 18 km away, had controlled access
via security gates, barriers and guards to restrict access by casual visitors and the curious
press – a ‘company town’ having equivalents at Hanford and Los Alamos. While not seg-
regated by sex, such sparse environments had many of the trappings of a monk-like exis-
tence and encouraged participants’ strong commitment to their projects.42 Similar
operational security was a feature of the new occupations at the British atomic energy
establishments, situated on former military bases. A reporter touring the still-incomplete
Harwell establishment in 1948 noted that ‘our ﬁrst sight of Harwell [was of] the ten-foot
high barbed wire fence around the establishment. The ﬁrst people we met were uni-
formed War Department Police and plain-clothed security ofﬁcials of the Ministry of Sup-
ply.’43
At the US national laboratories, security concerns during the ﬁrst postwar years were
relatively uncontentious; the creation of the nominally civilian US Atomic Energy Com-
mission (AEC) meant that the military organization imposed by the Manhattan Project
was somewhat relaxed. On the other hand, the now publicly known atomic energy facili-
ties raised new security concerns about espionage, and worked against openness. Walter
Zinn, Director of Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and of the US reactor develop-
ment program, casually excused its ‘startlingly large number’ of security personnel as
‘required due to the multiplicity of locations and due to the insistence of the Atomic
Energy Commission that all areas be under guard.’44
Cosseting
These secure environments also had some advantages. They were safe places for those
who gained entry. Even during the late stages of the Second World War, the Met Labora-
tory personnel had had the luxury of speculating about future applications. This was a
unique working environment for the participants: as Alvin Weinberg, long-time Director
of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) recalled, ‘Everyone could play the game of
designing new nuclear power piles . . . . Crazy ideas and not-so-crazy ideas bubbled up;
as much as anything because the whole territory was unexplored – we were like children
in a toy factory.’45 The wartime Anglo-Canadian project offered similar freedom to muse.
The Canadian pile became operational in September 1945, four weeks after the Hiro-
shima uranium and Nagasaki plutonium bombs were dropped.46 For the Anglo-Canadian
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group focused on reactor theory and building the ﬁrst Canadian reactor, the use of the
bombs themselves was marked by relatively little reaction. Cockcroft had spent the weeks
preceding the Japanese events writing a scientiﬁc account of chain reacting systems, and
the month before that was devoted to a memo outlining postwar possibilities for generat-
ing power.47 While bomb design had urgency, the development of reactors encouraged
expansive dreams.
The postwar environments of the national laboratories further liberated their specialists
to explore the possibilities of atomic energy for transmuting elements, applying them to
medicine and agriculture, generating power and any number of other possibilities. Fund-
ing was copious, especially in the USA. Research could be undertaken with relatively
beneﬁcent ﬁnancial scrutiny. For the Canadians in particular, the new ‘Atomic Energy
Project’ had an open remit of exploration.
Intellectual isolation
The physical isolation of secure sites bred intellectual isolation, too. As Peter Galison has
discussed, the classiﬁcation of knowledge – military secrets, trade secrets, inventive
expertise – accelerated during the twentieth century and especially after the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 (‘the founding document of modern secrecy’) with profound conse-
quences.48 Governments had been careful to contain the circulation of nuclear knowledge
that could have military, commercial or other advantage. Expertise having potential for
threatening national security was particularly suspect, and most nuclear knowledge could
be, and was, interpreted in this way. Thus, a Committee on Declassiﬁcation set up by
General Groves in 1945 had generally opted to withhold both ‘facts of nature’ and engi-
neering data.49 The ostensibly civilian AEC interpreted ‘restricted data’ just as conserva-
tively to include not just ‘all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic
weapons,’ but also ‘the production of ﬁssionable material [and its use] in the production
of power’ or other applications.50
It was similar in the UK.51 The McMahon Act provided an operational model for
British practices, imposing a layer of secrecy over the national program. Although the
mutual American–British concealment was motivated by economic as much as military
conﬁdentiality, the perceived threat of Soviet espionage dominated the following dec-
ade. Indeed, the Division of Atomic Energy was sometimes more cautious than its US
counterpart. In reviewing a proposal by the AEC Director of Classiﬁcation, Christopher
Hinton admitted that the current secrecy was ‘unhealthy and undesirable,’ but argued
that more than ‘the technology of advanced reactors and the design of atomic weapons’
should be classiﬁed; the British view was that ‘instrumentation, health physics and con-
trol techniques in connection with reactors’ also should not be considered open ﬁelds.52
As Galison argues, nuclear security, while having few guiding principles, bore a
strong resemblance to long established trade secrecy. Manhattan Project administrators
had feared British commercial interests in atomic energy, and postwar British access to
American information was even more seriously curtailed. The same was true within the
UK: despite the embedding of ICI’s working culture in the new atomic factories, Hinton
found technical information about even mundane factory equipment difﬁcult to obtain
from his former employers owing to old-fashioned commercial conﬁdentiality.53
Despite the non-military orientation of the Canadian atomic energy project, Chalk
River administrators mirrored American clearance procedures in part to encourage
reopening collaboration but, in the short term, merely to allow Canadians to receive
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American classiﬁed training. Some courses – particularly those at the Oak Ridge Institute
of Nuclear Studies (ORINS, 1947) on the use of isotopes (the least secret of the secret
technologies) – considered and occasionally granted access to vetted Canadian and Brit-
ish workers. Even so, requests by Canadian scientists to attend ORINS had to be
channeled from Chalk River consecutively to the Canadian Department of External
Affairs, the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, the US State Department and the FBI,
because US ofﬁcials mistrusted Canadian security procedures.54 Yet this was still a lim-
ited concession. That mistrust meant that courses at the neighbouring Oak Ridge School
of Reactor Technology (ORSORT, 1950) remained ﬁrmly out of bounds.
In terms of intellectual isolation, then, the USA, UK and Canada followed broadly
similar paths.
Filtering
While the classiﬁcation of information shaped activities at the national laboratories and
beyond, for individual engineers and scientists working on the national atomic energy
programs there was a more personal relevance of security: its inﬂuence on employment
and career progression. Given the security context, it is not surprising that the political
backgrounds of potential staff in each country were vetted. It is equally clear that this
scrutiny was seminal for the ﬁrst cohort of specialists. They worked for a single
employer: their government. It meant that a politically ﬁltered generation was admitted to
the new ﬁeld.
Loyalty oaths for new employees, for example, were replaced by mandatory FBI
checks at Argonne in 1950, which could also be instigated by anonymous reports or sus-
picions after employment.55 These expressions of symbolic secrecy had more individual-
istic outcomes, however. AEC workers suspended under the Atomic Energy Act after an
FBI investigation could ﬁnd themselves denied due process by the Personnel Security
Review Board, unable to learn the charges against them or to cross-examine witnesses,
because the Commission was unwilling to reveal its sources of information.56 While spe-
cialists denied posts at the national laboratories often found employment at ﬁrms or uni-
versities engaging in non-classiﬁed work, the risk of career consequences was
considerable: government-sponsored research was growing rapidly at industrial research
establishments and universities, and it appeared that political liberalism was being identi-
ﬁed increasingly as disloyalty.57 Ritualistic avowals of loyalty, like the recitations of
matins prayers in monasteries, thus carried inordinate weight in working life.
This scrutiny of political views was more contested in the UK and Canada, which had
not embraced the same degree of communist suspicion as in the USA. The personal dimen-
sion of security was well characterized by British physicist Neville Mott: ‘Anyone entering
a government establishment will know that for the rest of his career his political life and
associations will be under observation, and his advancement and perhaps his job will
depend on them. This will not add to the attraction of a career in government service.’58
As emphasized above, this environment affected engineers and lower-tier technical workers
even more assuredly than relatively vocal scientists. Postwar organizations of nuclear
workers – including substantial numbers of engineers as well as scientists – addressed the
national, professional and personal consequences of government security policies.59
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Categorization and representation
The ﬁltering of employees could also operate more subtly through the management of
union representation. Because Du Pont had never unionized its commercial plants, most
of the wartime and postwar reactor operations personnel were not union members. The
segregation of the Manhattan Project and later national laboratory sites, as well as the
unfamiliar job categories attached to the new atomic processes, had inhibited union repre-
sentation further. What was true for the technical and engineering staff was equally true
for the scientists: the universities, acting as contractors for several Manhattan Project
sites, were mostly non-union employers: the University of Chicago, for example, had no
union agreement extending to Met Laboratory or Oak Ridge personnel.
From the government viewpoint, organized labour could effectively map the work-
force to national objectives, but equally could oppose and disrupt those objectives for the
more self-interested goals of its members. Wartime American unions accepted the argu-
ment that, unlike construction workers, the process workers at Du Pont’s Hanford piles
and plutonium separation plants were privy to classiﬁed information, skills and equipment
to carry out their jobs, and that the processes they controlled were particularly vulnerable
to disruption or damage if, for example, work stoppages or strike action were taken. Nev-
ertheless, local branches contested Manhattan Project management of numerous aspects
of labor relations.60
After the war, when US labor unions reached their largest expansion, there was more
maneuvering room for organization of skilled workers at the production facilities. For site
administrators, though, unionization represented a loss of control. It threatened to provide
a back door for divisive voices, and even for external subversion. At best, the bargaining
tool of strikes or other withdrawal of labor would be unpatriotic, limiting production of
nuclear materials deemed essential for national defence; at worst, they could inhibit
removal of suspect employees and so facilitate espionage.61 More than any other profes-
sion in the postwar period, then, nuclear workers were sequestered and categorized by
their governments. Union representation – particularly on the national scale – challenged
not just working conditions, project goals and operating costs, but the emerging public
message of atomic energy.
For such reasons, unionization of postwar AEC technical staff was initially resisted
by administrators. Having interviewed employees in 1946, agents of the Intelligence
Ofﬁce at the Hanford Engineer Works suggested, for example, that there were no griev-
ances requiring collective action, reporting that the ‘benevolent paternalism’ prevailing at
the site was ‘strikingly illustrated by the often repeated query, “What does the govern-
ment and General Electric wish us to do?”.’62 Yet there was a quandary: the restriction of
information demanded by site secrecy could, they implied, encourage unpatriotic self-
interest and a dangerous element of organizational instability:
most of the membership [of one of the new unions] do not understand the importance of the
Hanford Engineer Works and . . . are not aware that about a year ago for security reasons
President Truman asked unions not to organize, nor that in April, 1946, the Secretary of
War requested . . . they not organize at Hanford.63
Other sites evinced the same concerns. At the Argonne National Laboratory, the Board of
Governors discussed ‘the union problem,’ and forecast that the existing unions might cre-
ate ‘some trouble’ when the Atomic Energy Commission Review Panel began dealing
with the ‘security cases’ in 1948.64 Not until the Eisenhower administration’s revised
Atomic Energy Act (discussed below) did unionization spread, and mainly to lower-tier
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workers: in 1954 General Electric signed a contract with an assortment of craft unions,
the Hanford Atomic Metals Trades Council and, the following year, US nuclear workers
represented principally by the Chemical Workers’ Union combined with those in the oil
and chemical industries to form the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers’ Union
(OCAW).65
British labor policy during the same period had a different emphasis. The secrecy of
specialist atomic knowledge was an undercurrent that inﬂuenced professional identity of
engineers and labor representation of skilled nuclear workers even more overtly than in
the USA, and focused on the potential danger of unions as harbors of destabilizing politi-
cal subversion. The UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), as the employer and educa-
tor of most British nuclear workers in the mid 1950s, sought to shape its workforce and
public attitudes concerning them.
Canadian representation of nuclear workers was distinctly different owing, in part, to
the eschewing of military applications of atomic energy. Just as the UKAEA had inher-
ited ICI disciplinary divisions and Ministry of Supply practices regarding trade unions,
Chalk River shaped its workforce according to the template of the National Research
Council. Unlike the UK, the Canadian Atomic Energy Project encouraged its employees
to unionize with fresh identities bearing novel and, one might presume, status-bearing
categories.66
Rising security and its effects
Towards the end of the decade further events interpreted as destabilizing to US interests
seemed to vindicate the policy of rising security. In September 1949, the Soviet Union
tested its ﬁrst atomic bomb; a month later, with the declaration of the end of the Chinese
civil war, Mao Zedong signed a mutual assistance pact with Joseph Stalin; and, in mid
1950, North Korea invaded the south. These events, overtly provocative to Western eyes,
were mirrored by unsettlingly covert ones, too. Espionage was discovered repeatedly
within the nuclear programs.67 Jessica Wang has well portrayed how this age of anxiety
affected US scientists, if not engineers.68 Indeed, postwar organizations such as the AEC
were top-heavy with scientists, and underrepresented engineers both publicly and pri-
vately. Yet such incidents seemingly were perpetrated by foreign scientists, vaunted by
their governments as the creators of the atomic secret, and by some of their US engineer-
ing counterparts, even though security measures affected all nuclear workers.69
The ﬁrst atomic spy scandals, involving scientists Allan Nunn May (made public in
March 1946) and Klaus Fuchs (February 1950), and the defection of University of Liver-
pool scientist Bruno Pontecorvo to the Soviet Union (August 1950), had links directly to
the origins of the three atomic energy programs. The ﬁltering of project personnel was
correspondingly increased. When Fuchs, Head of Theoretical Physics at Harwell who had
worked at Columbia University for the Manhattan Project, was convicted of espionage,
security measures in Britain increased further – so much so that the Atomic Scientists’
Association (ASA) issued a statement hinting at Stalinesque excesses in ‘the Civil Ser-
vice purge of persons who are members of extremist political organisations and likely to
weaken national security.’ The ASA urged the British government not to extend security
to other institutions such as industry and universities.70
This reputed connection between political viewpoint and reliability affected nuclear
specialists at every level. In Britain, the ASA, representing mainly scientists and engi-
neers, steered an awkward 13-year course between ofﬁcial representation and
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independence. Its ﬁrst meeting agreed to supply technical advice for the defence in the
espionage trial of Allan Nunn May, and such forthright stances appeared dangerous to
some.71
While employees of the Division of Atomic Energy were well represented in the ASA,
they complained increasingly about some of the public positions it adopted. For example,
the Atomic Scientists’ News argued that the British program was excessively cautious
about security criteria, a claim strongly denied by a Council member.72 Internal debate
raged about the representation and political role of the ASA. One of its Vice Presidents
argued that the Association was unrepresentative of the genuine cohort of specialists
employed at the government research centers: ‘therefore in most ways the real Atomic Sci-
entists have to be represented by others – partly ex-Atomic Scientists and partly people
who have never had anything to do with this type of work.’73 John Cockcroft, although
serving as a VP himself, argued that the Civil Service discouraged its employees from
holding ofﬁce in such an association, with the result that ‘the initiative is apt to pass into
the hands of the very left wing scientists.’74 Engineers, while working alongside such
activist scientists, remained a nearly invisible constituency during this period.75
National ﬁltering was also increased. Senator Pat McCarran (1876–1954) subse-
quently sponsored two bills to limit communist inﬂuence on US research institutions (see
Table 1). The Internal Security Act (1950) and Immigration and Nationality Act (1952)
limited entry to the USA by foreign scientists, technologists and educators. The visa
restrictions imposed by the State Department further isolated Americans from their inter-
national peers.76 The British government was equally wary in the months after Pon-
tecorvo’s defection. When the passport of physicist E.H.S. Burhop was revoked after he
had accepted an invitation to visit Moscow in 1951, a ﬂurry of protest to the ‘island
arrest’ led to its reinstatement, with the caution that Burhop consult the Foreign Ofﬁce
before considering any visit to a country in the Russian orbit.77
The American espionage case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg – arrested in 1950 and
executed in 1953 – further challenged the reliability of lower-tier nuclear workers, and
provided ammunition for Senator Joseph McCarthy (1908–57) to prosecute a campaign
alleging communist subversion throughout American institutions.78 For a period of four
years, during most of which the stalemated Korean War exacerbated paranoia, McCarthy-
ism heightened national security through narrowly conceived patriotism.
For US nuclear workers there were three forms of fall-out: an increased demand for
urgent nuclear development and production, more arduous loyalty checks and rising lev-
els of security. Their counterparts in Britain and Canada, hoping to regain contact with
their US peers, adopted similar security measures. Chalk River consolidated its status as
a closed site accessible only to cleared visitors. As perceived international and domestic
threats grew, its borders became more immiscible: the Canadian press was refused access,
and the editor of Nucleonics, the ﬁrst US periodical in the ﬁeld, was even more summar-
ily dismissed.79 Indeed, John Cockcroft, Director of AERE Harwell, was irritated to dis-
cover that tighter security procedures applied equally to British, Americans and
Canadians visiting Chalk River.80 Americans, too, chafed at the heightened security. Even
though a USAEC liaison ofﬁcer remained based at Chalk River, at least one colleague at
Hanford urged that current restrictions on exchange of information be liberalized for US
beneﬁt.81
This ratcheted security had operational drawbacks. During the early 1950s, secrecy
became increasingly complex to manage; crosschecking how secrets could inadvertently
be revealed through innocuous publications was becoming arduous. At the same time,
declassiﬁcation was being superseded by the rise of independent nuclear research
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conducted in other countries. After the Soviet Union detonated its ﬁrst atomic bomb, the
US committee on declassiﬁcation decided that there was nothing to lose, and perhaps
something to gain, by fully revealing some simple reactor designs.82
Security constraints also hampered industrial contributions to national objectives. Du
Pont was stymied in 1950 when the US government urged the company to assume a new
postwar responsibility – designing and operating a new generation of plutonium reactors
at Savannah River, South Carolina, to supplement the rapidly deteriorating Hanford, man-
aged since 1946 by General Electric. Its engineering managers – shuttling between the
now established national laboratories at Argonne, Oak Ridge and Brookhaven to consult
on design details of the planned reactors – discovered that the knowledge developed over
the intervening ﬁve years was either classiﬁed or stored at speciﬁc restricted laborato-
ries.83 One senior engineering manager complained that the AEC offered no training
courses for pile physicists, and that suitable instructional material was not available in
coherent form.84
Restricted diffusion: security in training and dissemination
The questions of engineering knowledge transfer and training were perennial for AEC
contractors. Because of secrecy, the growing expertise of nuclear engineering could not
be taught at colleges or universities.85 Pooling resources and scarce expertise, Du Pont
and General Electric agreed to support a joint training school at the Hanford site, despite
the companies’ different industrial cultures: for Du Pont engineers, Hanford was a versa-
tile and malleable collection of plant for producing a chemical product; for their GE suc-
cessors, the reactor was a product in its own right, akin to the industrial transformers and
generators that had made the company’s fortune. This disciplinary oscillation illustrates
the tentative embedding of their new knowledge and its sensitivity to local context – both
exacerbated by site segregation.
From the perspective of would-be nuclear specialists, such collaborations were unusu-
ally restrictive. All the early courses on the deeper aspects of atomic energy were given
at government facilities, usually for selected participants from the military services, indus-
try and universities. Research and teaching of classiﬁed nuclear topics to restricted audi-
ences had begun on a small scale at the Oak Ridge Laboratory and MIT in 1946.
Postwar policy on education was summarized by Major General Kenneth Nichols
(1907–2000), former deputy to General Groves, who argued that ‘secrecy and govern-
ment control of the atomic energy ﬁeld may appear to be limiting factors’ for an educa-
tional program, but that concerns about security could be overcome by government
sponsorship – via AEC contracts or through temporary employment of academics at the
National Laboratories and AEC industrial contractors.86 The new discipline would, in
short, be state managed.
The best example of this sponsored training was at the Oak Ridge School of Reactor
Technology (ORSORT, 1950), available until 1960 only to vetted US citizens.87 The cur-
riculum, further restricted to engineers and scientists sponsored by the AEC and by US
industries holding AEC contracts, conformed closely to government directives, ‘deter-
mined by the status of the declassiﬁcation program at the time the courses are pre-
sented.’88 British and Canadian training followed the same model at the security-
conscious Harwell, Windscale and Chalk River sites until the launching of university
programs in the late 1950s. Indeed, the British model continued to rely on training by the
UKAEA to supplement further education.89 Such training facilities underlined the
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monopolistic direction of the new disciplines of nuclear engineering by national govern-
ments, and their disconnection from conventional higher education establishments.
Like technical training, the publication of books and journals was centrally regulated
and locally managed for a decade after the war in much the way that monks selected,
protected and reproduced monastic knowledge. While copious articles and books popular-
ized the aspects of atomic energy that had been revealed in the 1945 Smyth report, few
went much further. The ﬁrst journals carrying details on atomic energy had been ‘pub-
lished’ for restricted audiences.90 The ﬁrst textbooks were censored to protect sensitive
details: Elementary Pile Theory, published in 1950 from declassiﬁed notes of the Clinton
Laboratory, was a mere 71 pages long. As its foreword emphasized, ‘the greatest part of
the work is still classiﬁed, and probably will remain so for some time.’91
Yet, as argued by Shils and Moynihan, controlling the ﬂow of information disadvan-
taged program goals. Du Pont’s subcontractors were required to implement security
measures when working on and storing classiﬁed information, requiring isolated ofﬁces
and locked repositories. Managers recorded being ‘severely handicapped’ by the lack of
cleared personnel to handle classiﬁed information, and the need for technical personnel to
be investigated for security risk through the remote New York Operations Ofﬁce.92 The
architectural company designing the buildings for Savannah’s heavy-water plant, for
example, required 175 employees to be cleared to Q, the highest security level, presum-
ably because details of spaces and installed equipment could reveal production methods
and capacities. So time-consuming were these tasks that at one point the AEC had to
issue Emergency Clearances for drafting personnel to complete their tasks on schedule.93
Peaceful applications: raising the veil
Thus the security surrounding atomic energy, its knowledge and its specialists, waxed
and waned between 1940 and the early 1950s. Proto-professions consequently were
discouraged in each country, and engineering practice and collective identity gradually
diverged at the half-dozen sites dedicated to reactor technology. In mid decade, however,
two international events publicly realigned atomic energy development towards peaceful
applications, loosening classiﬁcation and bringing new occupational clarity for nuclear
engineers.
President Eisenhower’s December 1953 address to the United Nations on ‘Atoms for
Peace’ sought to address the increasingly unworkable security regime for nuclear technol-
ogy. The speech capped his government’s efforts to publicize to Americans the loss of
the monopoly on nuclear weapons and the growing momentum of the Cold War. It
initially had begun as an extension of the Administration’s ‘Project Candor,’ a public
relations initiative that would stress the dangers of ‘Soviet capabilities, and on the rapid
growth of the Soviet economy’ with a strong undertone stressing the inevitable slipping
away of nuclear ‘secrets,’ but was recast positively as a ‘revelation of atomic power.’94
Despite its title and vague aim to provide ‘abundant energy for the power-starved
areas of the world,’ a brieﬁng paper coached US spokesmen that it was not a ‘plan for
exchange of atomic secrets with Russia or anybody.’95 Atoms for Peace was ﬁrst and
foremost a media-wise re-education of the US public; secondarily, it opened possibilities
for US-led dissemination of not-so-secret atomic secrets, via, for example, the ORINS
isotopes school. The US relaxation inﬂuenced Britain as well. That year, the UK reorga-
nized its own program from the civil service Department of Atomic Energy, tasked with
weapons development, by founding the UK Atomic Energy Authority, with its new role
‘to design, build and operate new types of reactor.’96
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Eisenhower’s initiative also prompted international responses that dramatically shaped
the nature of nuclear engineering. The UN conference on the ‘Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy’ held in Geneva in the summer of 1955 brought together the countries that had
been working on atomic energy in isolation for a decade. To the surprise of most partici-
pants, the specialists in each country were able to release details of their work that had
been secret months earlier. The propaganda advantage of openness proved compelling,
and a ﬂood of technical information resulted.
The Geneva Conference was cathartic for nuclear specialists. As the Director of
ORNL recalled, nuclear workers, along with governments and industrial contractors, were
swept up in the outpouring of information:
. . . the conference was presented with a vision of a future energy-hungry world for which
nuclear power was a panacea . . . . The tone of Geneva I was euphoria! And every one of us
was caught up in this enthusiasm: our supreme technical ﬁx, inexhaustible energy from ura-
nium, would set the world free!97
Soviet public expressions were similar in tone and content, employing terms such as
‘limitless possibilities,’ ‘the power of our age’ and ‘miraculous progeny.’98 Indeed, histo-
rian David Holloway ends his historical account of Soviet nuclear developments with the
feting in the west of Igor Vasil’evich Kurchatov (1903–60), the scientiﬁc director of the
Soviet nuclear project – shaking the hand of Walter Zinn, his US counterpart in reactor
technology, at Argonne, and ‘breaking the spell’ of secrecy for John Cockcroft, his equiv-
alent at Harwell – interactions made possible by the new openness.99
Public and professional identity
Only after Geneva were nuclear engineers publicly distinguished from their scientiﬁc
counterparts. The new rhetoric of atomic energy encouraged effusive praise for the
designers, builders and operators of facilities having peaceful purposes and public bene-
ﬁts. The channels for such messages multiplied through a raft of journals, books and
courses, as publishers and university departments scrambled to appropriate the newly lib-
erated knowledge.
As a result, the mid-decade thaw permitted a growing sense of common purpose and
professional identity among nuclear experts. In the USA and UK, societies of nuclear
specialists were founded. The American Nuclear Society, appearing in the months after
Atoms for Peace, was dominated by those employed in the national laboratories – partic-
ularly Argonne and Oak Ridge – and by employees of AEC industrial contractors. Its
earliest activities were to organize open conferences and to launch a new journal, Nuclear
Science and Engineering, that were not restricted by controlled circulation.
As this suggests, new publications represented a pent-up pressure for greater publishing
freedom and collective identity. In the UK, publisher Robert Maxwell’s Pergamon Press
created a series of nuclear engineering journals beginning with The Journal of Nuclear
Energy (1954) and Nuclear Engineering (1956); and, illustrating the eagerness to gain
ground, another UK magazine publisher transformed Combustion and Boiler House Engi-
neering into Nuclear Energy Engineer, the vehicle for his new Institution of Nuclear Engi-
neers (INucE, 1959), the ﬁrst organization to seek professional credentials in the ﬁeld.100
Unlike the ANS, however, the INucE was founded from a more disparate group aligned
with the emerging nuclear power industry. They were resisted by senior ﬁgures in the
Atomic Energy Authority, particularly by Christopher Hinton, who urged that conventional
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engineering disciplines could accommodate what he characterized as the narrow specialists
of atomic energy. The features of this episode, involving jockeying for intellectual space,
jurisdiction, status and identity between occupational groups in a shifting ecology of pro-
fessions, is well described by the sociological model of Andrew Abbott.101
The new periodicals gave a voice to both established and novice participants in
atomic energy, all favouring the lowering of security for common beneﬁt. This circulation
of knowledge after a decade of secrecy, argued John Cockcroft, was crucial to the sub-
ject. Introducing the ﬁrst issue of The Journal of Nuclear Energy in mid 1954, he lauded
the progress possible by the ‘interchange of ideas which is the basis of scientiﬁc and
technological development in peace.’102 American counterparts emphasized a similar
point. An editorial in Nucleonics magazine even offered to expedite the supply of the lit-
tle information yet available, ‘to assist any reader, especially those in foreign countries,
in getting non-secret information in the atomic energy ﬁeld . . . by advising on availability
and sources of information.’103
British magazine editorialists, allied with the emerging nuclear power industries rather
than the UKAEA, vaunted the optimistic commercial future made possible by rejecting
secrecy, and predicted the internationalization of nuclear engineering. The ﬁrst issue of
Nuclear Engineering, for example, identiﬁed national differences in the subject as a direct
and undesirable consequence of security, and an aspect that would soon fall to an interna-
tionalization of the subject:
. . . at Geneva last August . . . it became obvious that . . . the divergences that had occurred
were forced by local conditions rather than by fundamental conceptions. Similar conditions
will prevail in a single country unless an adequate exchange of views and information is
encouraged.104
John Cockcroft more pointedly praised the new atmosphere at Harwell:
[Before Geneva] the courses held at the school were secret and only British subjects could
attend them . . . . At this Conference, a very large amount of information on reactor technol-
ogy was publicly released for the ﬁrst time; indeed, the amount of ‘declassiﬁcation’ which
took place at Geneva was so great that it became possible to hold completely unclassiﬁed
courses at the Harwell school, and meant, of course, that foreign students could attend.105
And Cockcroft’s industrial complement, Christopher Hinton, emphasized the commercial
and occupational beneﬁts in the inaugural issue of the Journal of the British Nuclear
Energy Conference, noting that while the British industry ‘had worked behind a curtain
of secrecy . . . nuclear engineering had now emerged from that stage . . . as an important
industry in its own right,’ and civilian electrical power would give more freedom and
opportunities for employment to its workers.106
Enduring consequences
It is tempting for participants and historians alike to frame nuclear accounts as a story of
repressive and paranoiac concealment superseded by enlightened candidness, but a more
nuanced account reveals otherwise: the heritage of security proved enduring for the
careers of nuclear specialists.
Despite mid-decade exhilaration, the smoke of classiﬁcation was slow to dissipate. In
the wake of the Geneva Conference, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists dedicated an issue
to the ongoing problems of secrecy.107 And only 18 months after the conference did a
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new tripartite declassiﬁcation guide issued in Washington, London and Ottawa promise to
allow free mutual access to all phases of civilian nuclear power, but leaving other
domains still unrevealed. As a result, ‘the last remaining vestiges of secrecy’ at Britain’s
Calder Hall were to go, and information would be ‘freely available on fuel element fabri-
cation and reprocessing.’108 While national security was being toned down, however,
commercial secrecy remained a concern: Britain, the USA and Canada maintained strong
hopes of eventually exporting their technologies. Reactor economics and waste disposal
were also to remain sensitive areas that encouraged a defensive posture and considerable
reticence for the industry and its participants from the time of the ﬁrst Geneva Confer-
ence.
Ironically, the Windscale accident of October 1957, during which one of the two Brit-
ish production piles caught ﬁre and released radioactivity regionally, was an opportunity
for an unusual degree of information sharing between British specialists and their long-
estranged American colleagues. General Electric engineers noted that ‘some very nice
fundamental work,’ with ‘very capable technical people working on graphite problems at
Windscale and an equal number at Harwell . . . . This information would be helpful in
extrapolating present experience to future Hanford operations.’109 Openness remained epi-
sodic and incomplete between the two countries through the following years.
The British government mistrust of nuclear workers also persisted after Geneva. In
1957, the Secretary of State, Selwyn Lloyd, tarred an ASA report on the medical effects
of nuclear fallout as a product of ‘people with strong fellow-travelling tendencies and
leanings.’ In providing guidance for a government apology, a civil servant noted pri-
vately, ‘The Atomic Scientists’ Association, as is normal with associations of scientists,
has its share of political innocents (and at least one known Communist sympathizer): but
as a whole . . . are reputable, if somewhat naïve, bodies.’110 By 1959, the continuing
pressures dividing social conscience from occupational allegiance to the UKAEA proved
too much for the ASA ofﬁcials: the organization disbanded, with most of its activities
transferred to the British Association for the Advancement of Science, and published via
the magazine New Scientist.111
While the relatively elite atomic scientists were cowed by such clashes, nuclear engi-
neers and technicians were even more effectively controlled. Security concerns continued
to isolate British nuclear workers as an occupation and ﬁltered their ranks as a skilled
workforce. Thus when Labour MP William Grifﬁths complained in 1960 that UKAEA
job advertisements did not mention security clearance, despite ‘the past record of the
security services in dealing with persons of “left-wing views,”’ the Minister of Science
replied, much as he would have done a decade earlier, that ‘the chief risk is . . . that the
Communist faith overrides a man’s normal loyalties to his country and induces the belief
that it is justiﬁable to hand over secret information to the Communist party or a Com-
munist foreign power.’112
On a level less visible to the public, labour representation speciﬁc to this still-isolated
domain continued to be discouraged. Categorization, shaped by security concerns,
restricted the emergence of new occupational labels for those employed in atomic energy.
For example, The National Union of Atomic Workers (NUAW), founded at Capenhurst,
Cheshire in 1958 to represent craft workers, launched branches with over 2000 members
at ﬁve UKAEA facilities within a year. It challenged the existing (and Authority recog-
nized) unions, the National Union of Municipal and General Workers and the Transport
and General Workers Union, as anachronistic and poorly representative of the special
skills and unique working environment of its members. The Authority was steadfast in
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refusing to recognize the upstart group however and, denied bargaining power, member-
ship rapidly waned, disappearing by 1963.113
Fifteen years later, security anxieties had faded substantially but the role of unions in
consolidating professional identity was no clearer for more senior specialists. The Institu-
tion of Nuclear Engineers noted that no British unions proffered identity along the lines
of disciplinary specialty, nor acknowledged the special occupational conditions of work
with radioactivity. Indeed, because of the ongoing competition with the UKAEA-sup-
ported British Nuclear Energy Society, the Institution itself achieved only junior member-
ship among the engineering professions, offering little professional visibility for its
members.114
The ﬁeld continued to be hamstrung by secrecy through the 1960s and beyond, with
the quantity of classiﬁed information continuing to expand exponentially in the USA.115
The UKAEA, USAEC and AECL each encouraged reticence about the economics and
safety of their nascent industries, a heritage of security that arguably has endured. And
concerning domestic threats, the Nixon administration (1968–74) had strained relations
with both the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers’ Union and vocal employees of the
Argonne National Laboratory.116
As this suggests, the public representation of nuclear specialists continued to be
mediated largely by their governments and employers. Security had shaped working envi-
ronments and professional relationships enduringly. In the USA, the primary source of
professional identity had been the Argonne National Laboratory and its ﬁrst Director,
Walter Zinn, both emerging from the wartime Met Laboratory. In the UK, a distinct iden-
tity for nuclear specialists had been shaped at Harwell and within the Industrial Division
of the UKAEA by their ﬁrst directors, John Cockcroft and Christopher Hinton. Hinton
had shaped the British nuclear cadre by deﬁning them as variants of existing technical
professions, and playing a seminal role in tailoring UKAEA and subsequent university
training programs accordingly. In Canada, occupational identity was inherited from the
pre-war blend of engineering and scientiﬁc labour existing at the National Research
Council, having much the ﬂavour of a national standards laboratory. These organizations
– and the companies that grew to support their development programs and national indus-
tries – continued to serve as the public proxy of nuclear specialists. As a cadre of experts
born out of shrouded government projects and later employed by restricted industries,
nuclear workers largely accepted their relatively voiceless role.117
Conclusions
I have argued that three phases of security surrounding national atomic energy projects
shaped the ﬁeld of nuclear engineering and its specialists profoundly, but with relatively
subtle differences between the three wartime allies. The Manhattan Project, the postwar
period between the 1946 McMahon Act and the 1955 Geneva Conference, and the subse-
quent beginnings of the commercialization of nuclear power, identiﬁed distinct threats
from the circulation of knowledge and personnel. National governments consequently
played a unique role in deﬁning the nature of the subject by ﬁltering the workforce, sub-
sidizing and segregating development, deﬁning occupational identity, helping to create
disciplinary categories, and in supporting particular forms of professional identity. As ‘a
form of government regulation,’ to quote the Commission chaired by Daniel Moynihan,
secrecy thoroughly shaped these specialists.118
Security of information encouraged locally deﬁned and isolated disciplinary
foundations and fostered a monastic mind-set. The Manhattan Project had promoted
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compartmentalization and increasing divergence of intellectual foundations and technique.
At the same time, the urgent activities of large technical teams gave them rapidly accu-
mulating experience unique to each site. The result was not just regionally distinct
programs, but dissimilar nuclear specialists, too.119
National distinctions centered on the categorization of these specialists. While nuclear
engineer became a viable label at American research and production sites directed by the
US Atomic Energy Commission and administered by ﬁrms such as Du Pont and General
Electric, and consolidated by their support of the ﬂedgling American Nuclear Society, the
term was contested in the UK. Seeded by ex-ICI personnel, the UK Atomic Energy
Authority promoted the integration of atomic energy expertise as a branch of process
engineering. Its senior administrators shaped occupational identity by allocating lower-tier
nuclear process workers to existing job categories and encouraging their afﬁliation with
pre-existing unions. Higher-tier professional aspirations were stiﬂed by the resistance of
British professions and UKAEA to the upstart Institution of Nuclear Engineers. Canada’s
program was equally inﬂuenced by institutional cultures: growing from the National
Research Council environment of close cooperation between engineers and scientists, spe-
cialists had relative freedom to explore reactor technologies and, for the lower-ranked
engineers and skilled workers, at least, to vaunt their expertise through the creation of
new labour unions.
These distinct national experiences, like divergent religious orders, owed much to
their early segregation for reasons of security, allowing the original complement of staff
and organizational culture to deﬁne an independent course sustained by the technological
momentum of their reactor technologies of choice.120 Yet secrecy imposed similarities of
organization and identity, too, despite the dissimilar technological aims of the national
programs. Canadian nuclear specialists at Chalk River were arguably best placed at the
end of the war to continue their non-military reactor program, while their British counter-
parts struggled to build an organization devoted to plutonium production reactors, separa-
tion facilities and bomb design. Both countries adopted many of the features of American
postwar security at their sites to encourage a more liberal exchange of knowledge after
the McMahon Act. Owing to shared concerns about domestic and foreign espionage, the
severity of security procedures paralleled American changes – an outcome somewhat at
odds with Edward Shils’s depiction of distinct patterns of ‘luxuriating publicity’ jostling
with public ‘hyperpatriotism’ in the USA, as opposed to traditions of deference and pri-
vacy in the UK.121 In each country, the political allegiances of nuclear specialists were
scrutinized, selecting a cohort that met ofﬁcial guidelines but remained potentially sus-
pect. In the process, participants were rendered more homogeneous on a regional scale
and professionally invisible. In each national context, the state monopoly on atomic
energy instilled an unusual degree of common interest with its experts and industrial con-
tractors. In mutually supporting corporatist arrangements, all three parties promoted the
national growth of nuclear power industry and a sustainable cohort of trained specialists
to develop and staff it. Governments played a continuing role in representing the three
parties.
As closer examination reveals, this trajectory for nuclear specialists served national
interests more than the aims of professional identity. Even after program security began
to relax a decade after the Manhattan Project, nuclear specialists showed lasting effects of
their cloistered development. Security framed the early maturation of the ﬁeld and is inte-
gral to understanding its later development. The demands of security and state manage-
ment limited and ﬁltered information in ways that arguably fostered public mistrust of
atomic energy and its shadowy specialists. This history suggests enduring characteristics
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not just for the jobs performed by nuclear workers, but for their working identities and
their capacity to engage effectively with a wider public.
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